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EQUITY ACTS IN PERSONAM
(Continued from December Issue)
DECREES AND JUDGMENTS
Decrees and judgments are classified as in personam
and in rem. A decree in personam is one which imposes a
personal duty or a general pecuniary liability upon the defendant. A personal duty is one which can be performed
only by the action of the defendant or his agents. A general pecuniary liability is one which subjects the general
assets of the defendant, as distinguished from one particular piece of property, to the payment of the claim. A decree in rem is one which, without any action by the defendant in pursuance of it, deprives him of his interest in a particular thing, whether this result is accomplished directly
by the decree itself or indirectly by the acts of officers of
the court in pursuance of the decree. (1)
'Cook, Powers of IEquity, 15 Col. L. R. 37, Minor, Conflict of
Laws,
which
vol. 3,
passes

p. 184. Some authorities limit the term, decree in rem, to one
"bars the whole world." Beale, Cases on Conflict of Laws,
p. 538. According to these authorities a decree which merely
the defendant's interest in a thing is not a decree in rem.
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Originally all decrees in equity spoke in terms of personal command to the defendant and could be carried into
effect only by his act. They were therefore decrees in personam in form and in substance. (2) The procedural theory of the common law courts was that the parties to an
action owe no obedience to the court. "A court of common
law never lays a command upon a litigant, nor seeks to secure obedience from him. It issues its commands to the
sheriff (its executive officer)." (3). Courts of equity directed their attention primarily to the duty of the defendant
and vindicated the right of the plaintiff by ordering the defendant to do the. very act he was under a legal obligation
to do. "Equity has always employed * * * the very method
* * * which the common law rejected; for when a person is
complained of to a court of equity, the court first ascertains and decides what, if anything, the person complained
of ought to do or refrain from doing; then, by its decree or
order, it commands him to do or refrain from doing what
it has decided he ought to do or refrain from doing." (4)
At present decrees in equity generally speak in terms
of personal command to the defendant and are therefore
decrees in personam in form. (5) But courts of equity have
acquired, by judicial decision, rules of court, and statute,
the power, in some cases, to give a real effect to its decrees, i. e., to issue decrees in rem. ( 5a).
JUDICIAL DECISION
Courts of equity have assumed, in some cases, without
the aid of statute or rule of court, the power to issue decrees in rem. In an Alabama case, the court said: "It is
2

Clark, Equity, p. 9; Davidson vs. Sharpe, 28 V. C. 14; Landel,
Sum. Eq. P., p. 35.
sLandell, Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction, p. 23.
4Landell, Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction, p. 23.
5

5

Cook, Powers of Equity, 15 CoL L. R. 127.

a. Huston, Enforcement of Decrees in Equity. p. 71, et. seq.
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insisted that the decree of the court is erroneous in that it
undertook to invest the legal title in the complainants.
Courts of equity, in this state, have long pursued the practice of investing the legal title by their decrees. We ad-here to the old rule." (6) In a California case, the court,
without any attempt to justify its action by statutory
authority, decided that it had power to convey, by its decree ,legal title to certain shares of stock having a situs in
California from one held to be a constructive trustee of the
stock to a claimant, although the trustee was a non-resident
and served by publication only. The court said: "While it
is well settled that a decree for specific performance operates primarily in personam, yet in a limited and qualified
sense it may be said to operate in rem when the property
to be transferred under the contract is within the jurisdiction but the defendant is absent therefrom." (7) In a Nevada case, the court, in a suit to cancel a trust deed to
land because it was obtained by fraud, held that its decree
would operate to annul the deed complained of and also to
vest the title to the property in the plaintiff." (8)
These cases, in which the courts, without statutory
authority, on general equitable principles, asserted the
power to give a real effect to their decrees as to property
either real or plersonal are significant of the direction in
which the law is moving. "Equity", says the Wisconsin
court, "may in all cases so frame its decrees as to make
them effective to. do equity." (9).
STATUTES
Statutes giving a real operation to decrees in equity in
certain cases exist in England and in most of the United
ejones vs. Woodstock Iron Co., 95 Ala. 551, 10 South. 635.
TWait vs. Kern River Co., 157 Cal. 16.
sRobinson vs. Kurd, 23 Nev. 330.
9McMillan vs. Burke Asphalt Paving Co., 151 Wis. 46, 123 N. W.
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States. These statutes are of two types: (1) The English
type, which provides that whenever a decree for the exe-cution of a conveyance or other instrument by the defendant has been made, and he has failed to comply with the
decree, the court may appoint an officer of the court to
make the conveyance or other'instrument, and this instrument so executed shall have precisely the same force and
effect as one executed by the defendant; (2) The American
type, which provides that in case the defendant fails to perform the decree within a certain time, the decree itself
shall operate as a transfer of title. Occasionally statutes
provide that the decree shall in the first instance operate
to transfer title. (10).

The American type has the advantage of simplicity, directness, and celerity of operation. it is probably due to
the closer association of the courts of law and equity in
American jurisdictions. The English type, adhering to the
form of acting through the person, illustrates the tenacity
of this historical limit of equity jurisdiction. (10a).
These statutes are in some cases narrow in their scope.
Some apply only to cases of trusts; ("1) some apply only
to certain kinds of suits in equity; (12) some are confined
to decrees as to real property; (13) and some apply only to
certain specified cases relative to real property. (14).
Under some of these statutes the decree is still in form
in personam-a personal order directed to the defendant,
but by virtue either of the decree itself or proceedings taken under it, the complete legal title passes to the plaintiff.
Under other statutes the decree may be in form in rem, i.
lOCook, Cases on Equity, vol. 1, p. 107. et. seq.; Huston, Enforcement of Decrees in Equity, p. 13.
lea. Huston, Enforcement of Decrees in Equity, p. 20.
"lAct of June 14, 1836, P. L. 628, sec. 26; Act of June 7, 1917, P.
L. 447, sec. 56b.
12Act of July 7, 1885, P. L. 257, sec. 4.
lAct of April 19, 1901, P. L. 83, sec. 1.
14Act of June 7, 1917, P. L. 388, sec. 7.
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e., it may itself purport to vest the title in the plaintiff.
Under all of them, the decrees have become, in effect, decrees in rem.
RULES OF COURT
Rules of court sometimes give decrees in equity an effect substantially in rem. Equity Rule, No. 87, of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, provides, "The court, or
any law judge thereof, may * * * direct that the act required to be done shall be performed if possible by the
prothonotary of the court, in the name of and for the delinquent party, in same manner and with like effect as if
the latter had performed it, and this effect shall be given it
although the party is under a disability by reason of in-fancy, lunacy, coverture, or otherwise." Rule 8 of the Federal Equity Rules contains a similar provision.
This rule applies to the execution of deeds to real estate, and a deed executed in pursuance of it transfers the
legal title to the property. Such a deed derives its entire
validity from the decree. It is in reality the decree and not
the deed upon which the validity of the transfer depends;
and the decree is therefore substantially a decree in rem.i
The adoption of the Pennsylvania rule was doubtless
regarded by the court as a proper exercise of its statutory
power to adopt rules regulating the practice in courts of
equity. (16) The power of the court, authorized merely to
frame rules of practice, to adopt a rule of this kind, which
confers additional power upon the court, and does not
merely regulate the court's methods of exercising its power may well be questioned. (17).
Decrees in equity for the payment of money are given
an effect in rem by statutes which provide that they shall
15
See
6

Jones vs. Woodstock Iron Co., 95 Ala. 551, 10 South. 635.
l See Act of June 16, 1836, P. L. 784, sec. 13.
'7 The same observation may be made in regard to Federal Equity
Rule No. 8.
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constitute a lien on the real estate of the defendant named
in the decree. ('s).

EXECUTIONS
An execution is a writ issued by a court to enforce a
judgment or decree of the court. 9 There are two stages of
a judicial proceeding: (1) the primary stage, which includes
the judgment or decree and theproceedings prior thereto;
(2) the secondary stage, which includes all proceedings
taken to enforce the decree or judgment. An execution
20
belongs to the secondary stage.
Executions are classified as in personam or in rem.
An execution in personam is one directed against the person of the defendant. An execution in rem is one directed
against the property of the defendant. 21 The primary stage
of a judicial proceeding, considered by itself, may be entirely a proceeding in personam, as in an ordinary action
for a debt, but the secondary stage, the enforcement of the
judgment, may be in rem, as by the writ of fieri facias; and
thus the entire proceeding, considered as a whole, acquires
an effect in rem in reference to the particular property sold
under the writ.
IMPRISONMENT
Originally the secondary stage of a suit in equity was
necessarily a proceeding in personam. Its only execution
was an execution in personam. Imprisonment for contempt was the original and for a time the only method
which courts of equity had of enforcing their decrees. "A
decree * * * does not bind the right, but only the person to
obedience, so that if the party will not obey, then the Chan28 See Act of March 29, 1859, P. L. 289, sec. 1; Brooks vs. Phillips,
83 Pa. 183.
19 Shipman C. L. Pl. p. 50; Robinson, Elementary Law, p. 383.
20
See Penn vs. Lord Baltimore, 1 Ves. 444.
21
Clark, Equity, p. 8.
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cellor may commit him to prison until he will obey, and
this is all the chancellor can do." 22
The adoption of this form of execution was an historical accident. It was introduced by the early chancellors,
who were clerics, from the courts of the church, which
had in turn adopted it from the Roman law.2 3 The explanation is said to be two fold: (1) Equity adopted this process to correct a grave defect in the process of the common
law courts; (2) it was confined to this process by the
24
jealousy of the common law courts.
Imprisonment for contempt is still an ordinary and
usual method of enforcing decrees in equity, 2 but it is, in
many cases, a seriously ineffective method. It is operative
only upon the person of the defendant, and may therefore
prove ineffective if the defendant is contumacious, absent
from the jurisdiction, or otherwise not not amenable to the
process. 26 The ease with which this process can be evaded
by a simple change of residence into another state, speaking the same language and differing only geographically,
has rendered this process peculiarly ineffective in the
United States, and this ineffectiveness has become especially apparent in these modern days when business transactions so frequently take place without reference to state
lines.
WRITS OF ASSISTANCE
The necessity of supplementing the contempt process
as a means of enforcing decrees in equity was appreciated
22Knightly, Sergeant-at-law, in Y. B. 27, Hen. xiii, sec. 15, p.
6, quoted in Ames, Cases on Equity, p. 2, see also J. R. vs. M. P.,
Ames, Cases on Equity, p. 1; Clements vs. Tillman, 79 Geo. 451.
2SLangdell, Brief Survey of Equity, p. 23.
24
Ames, Cases on Equity, p. 1; Huston, Enforcement of Decrees
in Equity, p. 75.
25

Scott vs. Jailer, 1 Gr. 233; C. vs. Small, 26 Pa. 31; Morrison
vs. Blake, 33 Super. 290; C. vs. Lewis, 253 Pa. 175; Equity Rule No. 86.
26See report of Royal Commission on Chancery Practice, p. 8.
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by the courts of equity at an early date, and they have increasingly endeavored to obtain more direct and efficacious
methods of enforcing decrees. 27
The first step in this direction was the adoption of the
writ of assistance as a means of enforcing decrees. 2 This
writ was first employed to give interim possession of the
property in dispute to the plaintiff until the defendant
should answer.2 9 Later it was used to put the successful
party in possession of the realty and help him there.30 The
chancellor saw the sheriff putting plaintiffs-in-ejectment in
possession every day, and it was natural that he should
adopt this procedure.
It is now held that a writ of assistance may be used to
compel the delivery of personalty as well as realty,3' and it
has been used to compel the surrender of a ward to his
3 2

guardian.

Indeed, it has recently been stated that the remedy is
founded upon the general principle that the jurisdiction of
equity to enforce its decrees is co-extensive with its jurisdiction to determine the rights of the parties, and that
therefore the writ may be used when necessary to enforce
33
decrees requiring the performance of specific acts.

It has been held that the issuance of the writ must be
preceded by a decree requiring the defendant to do the act
desired. 34 The form of proceeding in personam was therefor preserved in the primary stage of the proceedings, although it was suggested that it might be more in accordance with modern ideas to put the plaintiff in possession at
once, as at law, without awaiting the obedience of the de27

Huston, Enforcement of Decrees in Equity, p. 71.
West, Symboliography, 189; Spence, Equity, p. 392.
-9Huston, Enforcement of Decrees in Equity, p. 80.
30C. vs. Lewis, 253 Pa. 183.
-1C. vs. Lewis, 253 Pa. 183.
28

32C.

vs. Reed, 59 Pa. 425.

vs. Lewis, 253 Pa. 175, e. g., the abatement of a nuisance.
24Appeal of Church, 13 Atl. 756, see also Equity Rule 86.
33C.
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fendant.35 However this may be, it is apparent that a writ
of assistance is an execution in rem, and that whenever it
is used the secondary stage of the proceeding is in rem, and
the proceeding viewed as a whole, is an exception to the
rule that proceedings in equity are merely in personam.38
The existence of the power to enforce decrees by a
writ of assistance does not take away the power to enforce
them by imprisonment, 37 nor does the existence of the power to enforce them by imprisonment take away the power
to enforce them by a writ of assistance.3 8
SEQUESTRATION
The next advance, which was even a greater one, was
the invention of the writ of sequestration as a method of
enforcing decrees in equity. This writ directed commissioners to sequester the personal property of the defendant
and the rents and profits of his real estate and to keep him
from the enjoyment of his property until he purged himself of his contempt.
The original object of the writ was merely the coercion of the defendant into compliance with the decree,
but its scope was later gradually widened so that any property of the defendant could be sequestered, and not merely
kept from the defendant, but, if personal property, sold, or,
if real property, the rents and profits used to satisfy the
3 9
plaintiff's claim.
The writ of sequestration may be used in Pennsylvania for the enforcement of decrees in equity.40 The existence of the power to enforce decrees by imprisonment
does not take away the right to enforce them by a writ of
35

Appeal of Church, 13 Atl. 756.
31C. vs. Diffenbach, 3 Gr. 370.
37C. vs. Lewis, 253 Pa. 183.
38C. vs. Diffenbach, 3 Gr. 370.
39C. vs. Lewis, 253 Pa. 175.
40
Equity Rule 86; C. vs. Lewis, 253 Pa. 175.
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sequestration, 4 1 nor does the existence of power to enforce decrees by sequestration take away the power to enforce decrees by imprisonment. 42 It has, however, been asserted that statutes abolishing imprisonment for debt prevent the issuance of a writ of sequestration to enforce a
decree for the payment of money, except, e. g., when a life
43
estate is taken in execution.
Out of the sequestration, developed the receiver with
all his important powers and functions, still further enlarging the power of a court of equity, to enforce its decrees
in rem.
STATUTES AND RULES
After the adoption and development of the writs of
assistance and sequestration, the courts ceased to create
new methods of enforcing decrees in equity by judicial decision, but the development of new methods independent of
the will or action of the defendant was continued by statutes and rules of court.
In addition to those already discussed, there are, in
many jurisdictions, rules of court or statutes which provide
that the executions available for the enforcement of judgments at law may also be used to enforce decrees in equity.
The Pennsylvania rule provides that "final process to execute any decree may be by a writ or writs of execution in
the form used in the same court in suits at law in actions
of the same general nature as the bill in equity in the particular case.144 Many of these executions are executions in
.r!m. The existence of such rules does not take away the
45
right to enforce decrees by imprisonment.
4

1C.

42C.
43C.

44

vs. Diffenbach, 3 Gr. 370.

vs. Lewis, 253 Pa. 183.
vs. Lewis, 253 Pa. 175.

Rule 86.

45Scott vs. Jailer, 1 Grant 237.
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PENNSYLVANIA
The acts of assembly conferring chancery powers upon
the Pennsylvania courts carry with them, as a necessary
incident, the authority to enforce decrees by the ordinary
processes of imprisonment, writs of assistance and seques46
tration.
The power to imprison for contempt has been somewhat abridged by the statute abolishing imprisonment for
debt.4 7 Imprisonment may not now be used to enforce decrees for the payment of money based upon a contract express or implied, but may be used to enforce decrees for
the payment of money if the obligation to pay was simply
an incident attached by law to the voluntary assumption
48
of a certain relation to the plaintiff.
The act of 1836, which provides that the punishment
of imprisonment for contempt shall extend only to such
contempts as shall be committed in open court and all other contempts shall be punished merely by fine, has no relation to imprisonment for the purpose of enforcing decrees
in equity, when the object is not to inflict punishment but
to compel obedience. 49
The courts of equity in Pennsylvania are not confined
to the method of enforcing their decrees which have

been discussed. They may in all cases so frame their decrees as to make them do equity.
"The jurisdiction of
equity to enforce its decrees is coextensive with its powers

to determine the rights of the parties, and the court will
therefore carry its decrees into full execution without seeking co-operation of any other court. The method of enforcing decrees is largely within the discretion of the court
making the decree, which may, if it sees fit, adopt such
vs. Jailer, 1 Grant 237. See also Equity Rules 86 and 87.
Act of July 12, 1842, P. L. 339.
4SMorrison vs. Blake, 33 Super. 290; Chew's Appeal, 44 Pa. 247.
-Tome's Ap., 50 Pa. 289; C. vs. Lewis, 253 Pa. 175.
46Scott
47
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alternative method as may be effective in carrying out its
order." 50
The maxim "Equity acts in personam and not in rem,"
has therefore, as applied to executions, ceased to be true.
CONCLUSION
"There is not a more fruitful source of error in the law
than the inaccurate use of language." 51 This seems to be especially true of the maxim under discussion. It should be
remembered, however, that "in the development of the law
it is seldom possible or, when possible, expedient, to discard established terms." "Instead of rejecting convenient
terms because they are ambiguous or not comprehensive,
it is better to explain their meanings. '52 The author has,
therefore, endeavored in the language of old Hobbes, to
take the terms of this maxim and "snuff them with definitions and distinctions so as to give a better light." The
performance of this task has convinced the author that the
courts in their interpretation and application of this maxim
have initiated a practice illustrated by the following famous
dialogue:
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in a rather
scornful voice, "it means just what I chose it to meanneither more or less."
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make
a word mean so many different things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to
be master-that's all."
Humpty Dumpty began again. "Impenetrability! that's
what I say!"
"Would you tell me, please," said Alice, "what that
means?"
50C. vs. Lewis, 253 Pa. 183.
51
Bank of Scotland (1914) A. C. 311.
52Hook vs. Hoffman, 16 Ariz. 540.
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Said Humpty Dumpty, "I meant by impenetrability
that we have had enough of this subject, and it would be
just as well if you would mention what you intend to do
next, as I suppose you don't mean to stop here all the rest
of your life."
"That's a great deal to make one word mean," said
Alice- in a thoughtful tone.
"When I make a word do a lot of work like that," said
Humpty Dumpty, "I always pay it extra. Ah, you should
see 'em come round me of a Saturday night, for to get their
' 53
wages, you know.
53Carroll, Through the Looking Glass.
WALTER HARRISON HITCHLER.
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MOOT COURT
SIMMONS VS. SLOCUM
Contract of Partnership to Defraud Creditors - Effect
toppel - Fraud as a Defence - Accounting

-

Es-

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Simmons and Slocum filed in the office of the, Prothonotary of
their county, a certificate that they had formed a partnership, for the
business of grocers, and described a share of each in the business as
$5,000. The business was carried on for 5 years, and then ceased.
The assets were sold by Slocum. This is a bill by Simmons, alleging
equal partnership, and asking for an accounting.* Slocum offers
proof that the property had been his alone; that the real relationship between him and Simmons was that of employer and employee;
that the disguise of partnership was adopted to deter creditors of
Slocum from interfering with the business and property embraced in
it. The court held the defence, if true, is insufficient, the decree being that Slocum should pay Simmons $5,000. Appeal.
Berman, for Plaintiff.
Bobick, for Defendant.

OPINION OF THE COURT
Amdur, 3. This is a suit to compel the accounting and payment
of $5,000 to the plaintiff as his pro rata share in the assets of the
partnership formerly existing between the present plaintiff and defendant.
There is no dispute as to the facts of the case, and we only need
consider the decision of the chancellor in the court below, holding
that the defendants were estopped from denying the partnership relation, which was set forth in the certificate filed in the Prothonotary's office, and which also was evidenced by other acts indicating
that a partnership existed, and that it is conceded the purpose was to
fraud creditors.
The law in Pa. is well settled that where a contract is made for
the purpose of defrauding creditors, the contract will be void as to
the creditors, but will be enforceable between the parties. In the case
at bar, the appellant is estopped from setting up his fraud in avoid-
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ance of the partnership agreement and the law will leave the parties
where it finds them, Paul vs. Paul, 266 Pa. 241; Mars National Bank
vs. Hughes, 256 Pa. 75.
Applying the rule that a contract entered into for the purpose of
defrauding creditors, is void as to the creditors, yet is binding upon
the parties, the defendants are prevented from setting up as a defence the fact that the stipulation was filed of record for an illegal
purpose, Sturgeon vs. Apollo Co., 203 Pa. 369.
The decree of the court below directing defendants to account is
affirmed.

OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
When two men A. and B. combine in a scheme to assist B., one
of them, to evade or elude his creditors, it seems odd that the law
should punish B. by allowing the other confederate A., to cheat him.
The fact as we must take it, is that Simmons was really only an
employee of Slocum, having no share in the business, as partner, but
in order to protect Slocum's business from being interfered with by
his creditors, a false certificate was joined in by Simmons and Slocum, averring a partnership between them. The decision of the
learned court below allows Simmons' double fraud to prevail; that
by Slocum on the earlier and later creditors of Slocum, and now that
on Slocum himself by his confederate. What sane public policy this
result promotes, it is difficult to see. It does not appear that any of
Slocum's creditors are unpaid, or that they have been even deceived
by the certificate. Things pertaining to a business are known in a
community, otherwise than through the assertions of those who are
prosecuting it. A punishment for the attempt to defraud Slocum's
creditors would be reasonable; but to adjudge this fraud to be worthy
of a fine of $5,000, and to decree the payment of the fine to the con. federate, seems not quite satisfactory.
However, the cases cited by the learned court below, seem to
coerce it into the decision that has been made, and Paul vs. Paul, 266
Pa. 241, contains a late repetition of the principle that when a false* hood is joined in by A. and B., to assist both in warding off creditors of B. from seizing property of B., when the seizure would be
detrimental to the interests of A. and B., A. may not only get this
advantage but may actually compel B. to pay him for his assistance,
$5,000, $10,000, $50,000, according to the tenor of the declaration or
confederate act.
The law is not 'leaving the parties where it finds them." It is
enabling Simmons, actively, to profit by the falsehood, which it is
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treating as truth despite evidence entirely satisfactory, of its falsity.
The judgment is affirmed.

BANK VS. HOPEWELL
Neg. Inst. Act of May 16, 1901, P. L. 194 - Promissory Notes
Fraud in Securing Endorsement - Effect of Fraud on Innocent Purchaser

-

-

Interested Witness' Testimony

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In a payment of a debt of X to the bank, he delivered to it his
note of $300, negotiable in form, with the endorsement of Hopewell.
X not paying the note at maturity, Hopewell was properly served with
protest. His defence, is that the endorsement was induced by false
and fraudulent declarations made by X. X as a witness, admits the
fraud. Hopewell also testifies to it. The bank gives evidence that its
cashier with whom for the bank, the transaction was, had no knowledge of any fraud practiced on Hopewell. The court said if the
fraud was practiced on Hopewell, he would not be liable unless the
bank accepted the note for a consideration and in ignorance of the
fraud and that the burden was on the bank to prove its ignorance
and the parting with a consideration for the note.
S. Kirk, for Plaintiff.
Berman, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
R. Garfinkle, J. The question involved in this case can be decided entirely under the Neg. Int. Act of May 16, 1901. After a careful examination of the facts of the case at bar, these questions present themselves for determination: 1st, Was the plaintiff a holder in
due course; 2nd, On whom was the burden to prove that it acquired
the title as a holder in due course?
Sec. 52 of the act defines a holder in due course to be as follows:
"A holder in due course is a holder, who has taken the instrument
under the following conditions; That it is complete and regular upon
its face; That he became the holder of it before it was overdue and
without notice that it had been previously dishonored if such was
the fact; That he took it in good faith and for value; That at the
time it was negotiated to him, he had no notice of any infirmity in the
instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating it.
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In considering the above only the last two need be considered
and discussed. As to the first two, it is conceded by the facts stated
and the testimony that they are not disturbed or negatived.
The evidence as to whether the bank received the note in good
faith and without notice of any defect in the title, depends upon the
credibility of the witness in this case, because it is through him the
bank transacted its business and consequently upon him they solely
rely. In 191 Pa. 610 it was held that as long as the credibility of the
witness was not in dispute, it was the duty of the court to render a
verdict and a submittance to the jury was unnecessary. The taking
of the note was solely by the cashier. The bank would thereby be
affected with any notice which he had, of the fraud upon Hopewell.
But that he had such notice is negatived by his testimony, of which
there seems to be no contradiction either by circumstances or by
other testimony, and of which there is corroboration. Now as far as
the bank securing the note for value is concerned, the answer must
be in the affirmative as due regard must be given to the Act of 1901,
sec. 25, of which states that value is any consideration sufficient to
support a simple contract. An antecedent or pre-existing debt constitutes value and is deemed so whether the instrument is payable on demand or at future time. It was held in 275 Pa. 117, that
under these provisions, the pre-existing indebtedness together with
the extension of time was a consideration for the notes. Since, then,
the bank is a bona-fide purchaser, the fraud practiced upon Hopewell cannot impair its right to recovery if it was a purchaser for
value.
Even if the bank received the note only as additional security for
the existing debt, it would be a holder for value. An antecedent or
pre-existing debt constitutes value and it is deemed such whether the
instrument is payable on demand or at a future time. And since it
is the rule of law that the promise of the debtor to pay a past debt
must be supported by a new and distinct consideration, it naturally
follows, after what has been said in support of this, that the plaintiff has given value for the note.
As to the fourth condition, it provides that at the time the note
was negotiated to him he had no notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating it. Sec. 55
of the Act names just what is essential for the title of the person negotiating an instrument to be defective. The defendant's own evidence, and that of X, his witness does not disclose any facts within
the knowledge of the plaintiff; or its officers, bringing notice or knowledge home to it or them, of any irregularity affecting the validity of
the note. On the contrary the testimony of X corroborated that of
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defendant and tends strongly to establish the fact that the bank- acquired the note for value, in due course and without notice or knowledge of any facts, which would justify a finding otherwise. And in
concluding it may be well to state here the equitable maxim to which
judicial cognizance must be given: "That as between two innocent
parties he who has caused it to be put in the hands of the other, by
the wrong-doer, must suffer the consequences."
The contentions of the defendant in this case do not hold water
according to any of the well recognized authorities, and furthermore
the cases cited on their behalf are cases which arose before the act
of 1901 and therefore have no propriety or bearing on the case at
bar. In view of the foregoing arguments the decision must be given
for the plaintiff. In further support of this case it pleases me to
state that in volume 25 of the D. L. R. page 219 there is a case the
facts of which are somewhat similar to these, and of which the principles there involved are as those stated here, and they are confirmed
and approved by Dr. Win. Trickett.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
That there was fraud in procuring the indorsement of Hopewell was testified by both Hopewell and X, the perpetrator of the
fraud. The jury had a right to believe these witnesses. If they did
believe them, a burden was cast on the plaintiff to show that it had
no knowledge of the fraud, and that it gave a consideration for the
note. Was the cashier, who negotiated the transaction, aware of the
fraud? His testimony, if alone, might leave the jury in doubt, since
he had a strong interest in the supporting of the bank's right to recover. But it is not found that he is the only witness to the bank's
ignorance of the frauds as was the case in 2nd National Bank vs.
Hoffman; 229 Pa. 429, Cf. Same vs. same, 233 Pa. 390. We assume
that the evidence given was enough to justify the inference of the ignorance of the fraud, and did beget that inference.
We think the decision of the learned court below is correct and
its judgment is affirmed.

ADAMSON VS. BOROUGH OF X
Divisible Contract - Two Suits On Same Contract - Failure to
Include Whole Amount Due, in First Suit - Soundness
of Doctrine of 205 Pa. 598 Questioned
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Adamson was employed as solicitor and attorney by the X Borough for $4,000 per year, payable in equal monthly installments. The
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year began January 1st. After serving until May without receiving
pay, he on May 13th, brought suit. He claimed pay for January,
February and March, $1,000, for some reason not claiming for April.
He obtained judgment. The Borough continued to default and in
August he sued again, claming for April, May, June and July. The
court allowed him to recover for only May, June and July.
Lawrence for Plaintiff.
Mirkin, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Lashley, J. In order to determine whether Adamson in his second suit against the Borough of X should have been permitted to
recover for his services during the months of April, which claim he
omitted from his first suit, in which he obtained judgment for salary
for the months of January, February and March, it is necessary to
consider whether the contract from which the cause of action arises
is divisible or undivisable. If it is the former he ought now to be
allowed to recover for his services of the month of April.
There can be little doubt that the contract under which Adamson was employed was a divisible one. It stipulated that his salary
should be $4,000 a pear, payable in equal monthly installments. So,
that if the Borough remunerated him for his services during some
months and failed to do so during others, he could bring an action
against it for the omitted months.
The fact that his salary was due in installments renders the contract a divisible one. Justice Woodward in Logan vs. Caffery, 30
Pa. 196 says: "If parties contract that a debt shall fall due and be
payable in installments, they have severed it, and we have seen that
a recovery of one installment even under a declaration which counts
for the whole debt does not bar a subsequent suit for an installment
not due when the first suit was brought." The decision in Buch vs.
Wilson, 113 Pa. 423 affirms that of Logan vs. Caffery.
Distinct causes of action arise where money is payable by installments upon the falling due of each installment; 23 Cyc. 1183.
The fact that the April salary was due when the first suit was
brought and that the plaintiff therein recovered do not preclude his
subsequent recovery for the salary of that month. "The rule against
splitting causes of action does not require a plaintiff who has distinct and disconnected causes of action against the same defendant,
each of which by itself would authorize independent relief, to join
them in a single suit, although they exist at the same time and might
permissibly be so joined," 23 Cyc. 1180. Terrerre vs. Jutte, 159 Pa.
244 and Milligan vs. Brouarsky, 147 Pa. 155 are confirmatory of this
principle.
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The plaintiff should have been permitted to recover for his services for the month of April and the lower court's refusal to permit
him to do so was error.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
There was one contract. It contemplated twelve equal payments.
It reasonably follows that performance of each payment should be
compellable immediately after it should become due. At the end of
the first month, $333.33 became payable, and suit for it could be instantly brought. At the end of the second month, if neither month's
installment'had been paid, $666.66. If suit were then brought, it would
have to be for all then due. If only the first month's pay were sued
for it would be impossible to sue later for it. Even if later, month's
wages became due and suit were brought for them, this suit could
not embrace the wages of the second month. Although in a sense,
the contract is divisible, it does not follow that a suit for past wages,
which omits April's wages then due, having been made, these omitted
wages may be recovered in a suit for them and later accruing wages.
The principle applied is, that all wages due when suit is at any time
brought, must be sued for at the same time, and, if omitted from the
suit cannot be combined with wages of later months or periods in
later suits. Such is the doctrine of Anhaltzer vs. Benedum, 266 Pa.
113; Jenkins vs. Scranton, 205 Pa. 598.
It might have been supposed that if no additional burden is put
on the court by the omission to include one installment, and by the
suing for it in conjunction with later installments, such suit for it
would be permitted. Here, the burden on the court is no greater
when the suit is brought for January, February and March salary,
and later for April, May, etc., than if the first suit had included the
April salary. The number of suits would be the same. But, no note
of this circumstance seems to have been taken.
It is necessary then to reverse the judgment of the learned court
below. Reversed.

BOUTON VS. X COMPANY
Food

-

Diseased Meat
Trichinae

-

Damages for Negligence Not Allowed
Evidence - Judicial Notice

-

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant slaughtered hogs in Indiana, shipped the meat to
this state, sold some of it to P, who sold it to R, who sold it to Mrs.
Bouton. The meat had undergone the inspection of the United
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States officers before shipment from Indiana. The husband of the
plaintiff ate some of the pork, became affected with trichinosis and
died. This is an action of trespass for his death. It does not appear
that the defendant knew that the pork was diseased.
Stickler, for Plaintiff.
White, for Defendant.'
OPINION OF THE COURT
Templeton, J. The nature and cause of this disease as well as
its prophylaxis have been discussed at length in Vol 16, New International Encyclopedia, page 912-913; Tavani vs. Swift Co., 262 Pa.
184; Ketterer vs. Armour, 247 Fed. 921.
From these authorities we summarize the following facts; The
disease is caused by minute worms, trichinae, taken into the human
body by eating infected meat, usually pork. The larvae of trichinae
are invisible to the naked eye and must be detected by the microscope. The absence of the parasite as apparent from a microscopical
examination of one piece of meat, does not show that another piece
of meat cut from the same carcass is not infected; nor does such apparent absence from one spot negative the presence of trichinae in
another spot in the same cut of meat. Therefore the only conclusive method of prophylaxis would be to cut the meat into minute
particles and subject each to microscopical examination, or to heat
the meat to 140 Deg. F., either of whih methods would destroy the
salability of the meat.
The defendant has not shown these facts, but he has asked us to
take judicial notice of them, and we think we can safely do so, 23 C.
J. 172.
It follows, therefore, that as the only method of surely detecting
the germ would be to destroy the salability of the meat, the defendant is not negligent in failing to do so, and consequently the plaintiff
cannot recover, Tavani vs. Swift Co., 262 Pa. 184.
It is quite true that the defendant in selling the meat impliedly
warranted its wholesomeness, irrespective of his negligence or care,
knowledge or ignorance of unfitness, both at common law and by
our statute of 1889, P. L. 87, quoted by counsel for plaintiff. But this
action is in trespass and plaintiff cannot recover in it for the defendant's violation of a contractial duty. This point was passed
over by the Supreme Court in Catani vs. Swift, 251 Pa. 52, and
pointed out in Tavani vs. Swift, 262 Pa. 187. We regret having to
deny the plaintiff's recovery for this manifest injury on a technicality
but it is not within our province to change the rules of practice for
her benefit.
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OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The intervention of several sales between that of the defendant
and that to the plaintiff, is not an obstacle to a recovery, Catani vs.
Swift and Co., 251 Pa. 52.
The rule that a dealer in food stuffs is liable to those who purchase it, directly or otherwise from him is justified as a means of
compelling him who has the opportunity -to discover the qualities of
the foodstuff before it is put in a course of sales and purchases. If
however, it is impossible for him to discover the defects (the trichinae in this case) the imposing of a liability would be a purely arbitrary transfbr of the damage of the ultimate consumer to the original dealer. There is sufficient reason for the belief that the dealer
could not have detected the pork's defects. He had then, to refrain
altogether, from selling pork or impose on himself and his vendees
the chance or risk that the meat was diseased and that disease would
follow its consumpfion. Apparently, the action against the original
vendor is, when not on a warranty, based on negligence. Where
negligence is negatived, the action will fail. As says Frazer, J. in
Tavani vs. Swift Co., 262 Pa. 184, "The action being in trespass for
negligence, and not for breach of warranty, the evidence (of inability
to detect the trichinae) was competent and sufficient to sustain the
conclusion of the jury that the defendant omitted no precaution or
duty owed to the plaintiff." _
The undiscoverability of trichinae may be judicially cognized.
Affirmed.

WALKER VS. WAGAN
Negligence - Automobile Passing Street Car in Violation of Statute
-Injury to Passenger Alighting - Contributory
Negligence Rule Discussed
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Walker rode in a street railway car, which stopped to deliver
passengers, desiring to alight. Walker got out of the car and moved
towards the curb of the street. In doing so, he was run into by a
swiftly moving automobile operated by Wagan, coming in the same
direction in which the railway car had been moving. The defence
is that Walker was negligent in not looking for the automobiles and
eluding that of defendant. The court said that he was not bound as
a matter of law to anticipate that any automobile would run in the
direction of the street car, along the car when it was delivering pass-
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engers.

The verdict was for $5,000 for pain, loss of earning power,

expense in securing medical attention and nursing.
Singer, for Plaintiff.
Gunnett, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Ingram, J. The Act of June 30th, 1919, P. L. 678, section 25, provides that "No operator of a motor vehicle, who meets or overtakes
a street car that has stopped for the purpose of taking on or discharging passengers, shall pass said car on the side on which the
passengers get on or off until the car has started and until any passengers, who may have alighted shall have reached the side of the
highway."
The act of defendant in driving past a street car which had stopped to discharge passengers before the plaintiff, a passenger, has
reached the side walk was a flagrant violation of the statute, Bohm
vs. Beckdol, 81 Super. 180.
And the Plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence in
not looking for approaching automobiles. He was under no duty to
anticipate the approach of the automobile. The plaintiff was where
he had a legal right to be, and the automobile of the defendant was
where it had no legal right to be and was operated at a high rate
of speed in violation of express provision of Statute, 81 Super. 180.
The failure to anticipate negligence which results in injury is not
negligence and will not defeat an action for injury sustained.
Even had he seen the approaching automobile, he would have
been justified in assuming that it would be stopped as required by
the Statute, Lewis vs. Wood, 247 Pa. 548.
The verdict for $5,000 seems excessive in view of the fact that
the evidence does not show how badly the plaintiff was injured. But
damages are a proper remedy for personal injury, and resulting pain,
loss of earning power, expense in securing medical attention and
nursing, Bosturick vs. Pittsburg R. R. Co., 255 Pa. 387; Yeager vs.
Anthracite Brewing Co., 259 Pa. 123. And as the amount of such
damage is a question for the jury, we are constrained to affirm the
decision of the learned Court below. Judgment affirmed.

OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The 25th section of the Act of June 30th, 1919, P. L. 678, 694, was
violated by the operator of the motor car, Wagan. That act required him to stop until passengers of the Street Railway Car had reached the curb. He did not stop. That he should be liable for the dam-
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age to the plaintiff is clear, unless plaintiff may be precluded from
recovering, because he was not on the lookout to discover whether
the defendant was obeying the statute.
That men forget statutes, that, even remembering them, they
at times do not heed their directions, is generally known; and may
be assumed to have been known by the plaintiff.. As a prudent man
then, would he expose himself to the frightful accident which befell
him, simply because he assumed that there was no forgetfulness and
no disobedience of the law by the operator of the locomotive? It is
difficult for one to accept this view.
It does not follow that he is not to be permitted to recover. The
principle that one who contributes even slightly to his injury can recover nothing from the defendant whose negligence was gross, and
tinctured with an indifference to possible injuries to others, which
It has been abandoned in
bordered on malice, is indefensible.
admirality, and by the legislation of Congress, which permits a reduction from the full measure of damage, in proportion to the magnitude of the negligence of the parties, plaintiff and defendant, but
does not forbid any recovery whatever.
No rule of such apportionment is recognized in the decisions of
this state. But it may be well to ignore altogether the imprudence of
the plaintiff in having had too much confidence in the willingness of
the defendant to obey the law. It agrees with the fact to admit that
there was negligence in placing so much confidence, at such risk, in
the human nature of the defendant; but justice is promoted, in escaping the barbarous result of applying the customary law which
prevents any recovery by a contributing plaintiff. See Bohm vs.
Beckdol, 81 Super. 178; Lewis vs. Wood, 247 Pa. 545, 549.
The judgment is affirmed.

COMMONWEALTH VS. TRESCOTT
Receiving Stolen Goods-Evidence-Testimony

of Accomplice-

Weight of An Uncorroborated Accomplice's TestimonyDuty of Court to Charge Jury
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Receiving stolen goods with knowledge that they were stolen.
The only witness against the defendant was X. who adinitted that he
had stolen the goods and testified that he had done so after an
agreement by Trescott to buy them from him and that Trescott had
paid $200 for them. Trescott denied knowledge that they had been
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stolen. The court declined to say to the jury that if X's testimony
were true he was an accomplice and that as such his testimony should
be accepted with much caution unless corroborated and that it should
be corroborated not merely with respect to the theft but with respect
to Trescott's knowledge of it. Verdict, guilty. Appeal.
Madore, for Commonwealth.
Lawrence, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Kline, J. The defendant was convicted of receiving stolen goods
with knowledge that they were stolen upon the sole evidence of the
thief. He appealed to this court.
The thief, having testified as to a prior agreement to dispose of
the articles that were to be stolen, is an accomplice according to the
law of Pennsylvania. In Commonwealth vs. Polise, 81 Super. 69,
Judge Henderson says, "the term accomplice with reference to the
quality of the evidence of a witness, means any criminal connection
with the matter on trial, either as principal in first or second degree
or as accomplice or as accessory."
The fact that the testimony comes from an accomplice raises the
question whether it should be corroborated or not before it can effect a conviction. It need not be corroborated as to all the elements
of the crime for then the accomplice's words would be surplusage.
Furthermore, it has been held in Pennsylvania that a single instance
of corroboration will give full credence to the rest of his story on the
theory that a man being truthful as to one point in a statement will
be in all points. In Com. vs. Ettinger, 98 Pa. 338, the court said, "If
it be shown that he has testified truly in one particular, the jury may
infer that he has done so in others." So if an accomplice is substantiated in part, the judge can put the accomplice's testimony on
the same level as that of a disinterested witness.
In Pennsylvania, the courts have established the rule that the
defendant may be convicted on the unsupported testimony of an ac-complice and that the judge cannot set the verdict aside, Com. vs.
Craig, 19 Super. 94; Cox. vs. Com., 125 Pa. 103. However, the judge
if he thinks that the accomplice was deliberately falsifying, ought to
advise the jury not to convict if the testimony is uncorroborated, 2
Trickett's Pa. Criminal Law 1050.
From the above rules, it can- easily be seen that if the defendant
had asked the court to charge the jury not to convict unless corroborated, not only as to the theft, but also as to Trescott's knowledge of it, such charge would be incorrect and rightly refused. But
the defendant did not ask for such charge. He asked the jury to be
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cautioned as to the value of the testimony. As we view the point, we
cannot see wherein it was legally incorrect. Its purpose was to have
the court to warn the jury of the value of the uncorroborated statements of an accomplice who may have been overzealous to secure
conviction in hope of leniency, freedom, or through personal animosity. Besides, thieves do not have a general reputation for veracity. In this case it is a question of deciding between the testimony of two witnesses, each having a strong bias. The court always
charges the jury as to the value of the defendant's testimony in his
own defence. In the interest of justice the jury should be cautioned
as to the weight of his sole accuser's words, especially since he is
a party in crime. It is true that the jury saw both testifying, their
manner of speaking and facial expressions, and in that way formed
opinions of their creditability. But that is no reason why the judge
should not warn them that an accomplice may have other motives
than those of truthfulness. Many times the accomplice is a better
actor than the defendant and secures more favor though speaking
falsely. On such occasion, a caution by the judge is entirely proper.
Some cases seem to hold, that, although an omission to charge
in the above manner constitute an error of practice, it is a discretionary duty and not a reversible error, 16 C. J. 698, Sec. 1424. The
indirect reason for this rule is the modern tendency to eliminate the
numerous legal means that acknowledged criminals use to keep at
large on bail, (and while at large, steal again to pay their bail). However, in a recent Pennsylvania case, Com. vs. Polise, supra, it is distinctly stated that it was error for the trial judge to refuse to direct
the jury to closely scrutinize the tesimony and accept it with caution.
That case in all essential facts is the same as the present except that
the defendant's denial was corroborated and that the points for
charge were not nearly as correct in the statement of the law as the
point for charge in this case. Still the Superior Court ignored the
irregularities and looked to the aim of the point and reversed the
lower court for refusing to charge specifically on the subject of an
accomplice's testimony. In the present case, even if the point for
charge were incorrect, still the judge, having had his attention called
to the matter, should have charged the jury in some way of the value
of an accomplice's testimony on the authority of Com. vs. Polise,
supra; Com. vs. Haines, 257 Pa. 289; Com. vs. Viscasky, 83 Super. 96.
The lower court not having charged the jury in the above manner, the judgment is therefore reversed and a venire facias de novo
awarded.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The only witness against Trescott, admits that he stole the goods,
and sold them to Trescott. He is plainly to be considered an accom-
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plice, especially since the theft is alleged to have been induced by
Trescott's agreement to buy the goods from the thief. Trescott's
guilt rests solely on X's testimony. The court declined to tell the
jury that the testimony should be accepted with much caution (since
it had not been corroborated). Why was this not said? Surely the
situation demanded "caution" and "much caution." Indeed the case
is rare when one man may be properly convicted of any serious
crime by the testimony of one other man, who besmirches his own
character by confessing his confederacy with the defendant in the
commission of crimes. It might have been unnecessary to give the
instruction craved, had it not been requested, but the denial of the
request may have lessened the juror's sense of obligation to be cautious and wary.
We approve of the decision of the learned court below. Affirmed.

HOWELL VS. MOORE
Promissory Notes - Distinction Between Negotiable and NonNegotiable - Liability of Endorser on Non-Negotiable
Note When Not a Guarantor or Surety
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Boswell wrote a note for $1,000 payable to Moore or order in
three months. The note contained a warrant of attorney to confess
judgment not limiting the confession to a period subsequent to the
maturity of the note. Before the maturity, Moore endorsed the note
to Howell, who, at maturity demanded payment from Boswell, and
failing to secure payment, gave immediate notice to Moore. The
court has allowed a recovery for the face of the note and interest.
Keil, for Plaintiff.
Baker, for Defendant
OPINION OF THE COURT
Berman, J. This suit was brought by the plaintiff Howell
to recover from the defendant Moore the amount due on a judgment
note of $1000, payable three months after date, which was subsequently endorsed by the defendant to Howell before maturity. Upon
non-payment of the note by the maker, Boswell, Howell immediately
gave notice to Moore, and is now attempting to recover the amount
of the note.
Under the Act of May 16, 1901, Sec. 5, P. L. 194 the effect of a
provision in a bond authorizing a confession of judgment before maturity is to make the instrument non-negotiable; and that a similar
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construction is placed upon a judgment note is evidenced in Volk vs.
Shoemaker, 229 Pa. 407.
In Shaffstall vs. McDaniel, 152 Pa. 189 it was held that where a
payee signs his name on the back of a non-negotiable instrument he
does not by that act become an endorsee of said paper. However,
proof is admissible to show the actual agreement under which such
endorsement was made, and the consideration by which the endorser
became responsible for its payment. In the case at bar there is
no intimation made as to an agreement of suretyship, nor any evidence showing the passage of sufficient 'consideration to make the defendant liable as a surety or guarantor.
Chief Justice Moschzisker in Miners State Bank vs. Auksztokalnis, 283 Pa. 18, 24 makes the following statement: "The note itself
contains a warrant of attorney to confess judgment at any time, and
this makes it a non-negotiable instrument. Under such circumstances,
if the endorsement were merely the defendant's signafure and nothing more, there could be no recovry thereon." The case at bar is
well within the above doctrine, and as this court holds the same conclusion it is therefore constrained to reverse the decision of the court
below and render verdict for the defendant.

OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The Negotiable Instruments Act, Art. 1, Sec. 5 says that "the
negotiable character of an instrument otherwise negotiable, is not
affected by a provision which * * * authorizes a confession of
judgment; if the instrument be not paid at maturity," and from this
has been inferred that if the entry of judgment is authorized before
maturity, the instrument is not negotiable, Volk vs. Shoemaker, 229
Pa. 18; Guaranty Corporation vs. Hughes, 81 Super. 264.
The endorsement of a non-negotiable instrument without more
creates no liability. Merely giving notice to Moore of Boswell's
failure to pay, could create no duty in him to pay.
The judgment of the learned trial court must be approved. Affirmed.

MAXWELL VS. TURNER
Contract -

Sale Oral Agreement - Warranty, Expressed or
Implied - Inspection - Notice - Laches

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Maxwell sold to Turner 100 tons of coal, of a certain quality and
constituents, payment to be made on every delivery of ten tons. The
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coal has been delivered but found to be not of the prescribed quality
and constituents. The written contract said nothing of quality, but
Turner orally insisted that the coal should be such and executed the
writing on Maxwell's assenting to the demand. Beside the uses
which were to be made of the coal were known to Maxwell who must
have known of its unfitness for such uses. Three months elapsed
before Turner advised Maxwell of the defect in the coal. He has
refused to pay for the coal and notified Maxwell to remove it. Maxwell declines to recognize a right of recission and Turner has not
shown the difference in value of the actual coal and that of the coal
having the qualities for which he bargained. Maxwell claims the
contract price.
Smith, for Plaintiff.
Snavely, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Solway, J. The question in the case before us is plain. If Turner has kept the coal for an unreasonable time before notifying Maxwell then we must hold for the plaintiff, if, on the other hand the
time was reasonable, we must hold for the defendant. The time
elapsing from the delivery until notification that the coal was not of
the kind prescribed was three months.
To determine this question we must first decide whether or not
it is one for 'the court or jury. The right of recission exercised in
due time is generally a question for the jury but where the time was
so short or so long it is justifiable for the court to decide as a matter
of law. Also, where facts are admitted in an affidavit of defence
which must be taken as true and must be considered as asserting as
strongly as possibly anything that defendant can say in his favor, the
question becomes one of law for the court, Wesbitsky vs. Fisher, 64
Super. 284.
Due diligence in inspecting goods purchased within a reasonable
time is required by law, Wright vs. Carbonic Co., 271 Pa. 332; Wright
vs. Bristol Leather Co., 257 Pa. 552; Pierce vs. Steel Co., 184 Pa. 55;
35 Cyc. 153.
Maxwell in the case at bar was not notified that the coal was unacceptable until three months had elapsed. Within a much shorter
time, Turner could have made a test to determine the fitness of the
coal. It is a task that requires neither great expenditure of time or
labor and one that the defendant should have performed. To allow
a sale to hang in balance for three months is an injustice on the seller. We therefore hold for the plaintiff.
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OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The coal was warranted to be of a certain quality. The writing
said nothing, on the subject, but Turner orally insisted or, the pos-session by the coal, of certain properties, before executing the writing, and Maxwell assented to the demand.
The coal has been found by Turner not to possess the warranted qualities. But, he has allowed three months to elapse before
advising Maxwell of the defect in the coal. No explanation of this
long delay is given. The defect, so far as appears, must have been
discovered long before the notification of Maxwell; or there was undue delay in making the discovery of the defect..
The court may properly say that the delay is excessive and unreasonable, as it has done. The sale is not open to rescission.
But, there was a warranty on which, for defects and inferiorities
of quality, damages would be recoverable. The defendant, however,
has not shown to what extent the value of the coal obtained by him,
was less than that of the coal which Maxwell contracted to deliver.
We see no reason then for questioning the correctness of the decision of the learned court below, that the contract price must 'be
paid by the defendant. Cf. Wright vs. Carbonic Co., 271 Pa. 332;
Milling Co. vs. Rosato, 81 Super. 94. Affirmed.
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BOOK REVIEW
Cases on Criminal Law. By William E. Mikell, St.
Paul. West Publishing Co., 1925. pp. ix, 779.
This book is composed of cases and extracts already
appearing in two case books previously prepared by the
editor, together with about sixty cases not appearing in
either of the previous books.
It is to be regretted that the editor has followed so
closely the plan and incorporated so much of the material
of his previous books. It is difficult e. g. to think of any
justification for retaining a case like C. vs. Mosler, 4 Pa. 264
and rejecting a case like P. vs. Schmidt, 216 N. Y. 324.
One of the avowed objects of the editor is to trace the
growth of the law to its present state. This object is not
accomplished nor is its accomplishment seriously attempt-ed. Occasional extracts from text books and a few cases
depict the state of the law at some former period, but the
history of no part of the criminal law is adequately presented, as indeed it cannot be, and should not be, by the
case method of instruction.
The editor's treatment of the "nature of crime" seems
to the reviewer, to be inferior to that of some other books,
notably those of Mr. Beale and Mr. Kinney, and his treatment of "mens rea" needs much supplementing to make it
adequate.
However, the book is, on the whole, admirably adapted
for teaching purposes, and the present edition is much superior to the earlier ones. The reviewer has used it in his
classes and intends to continue to do so.
W. H. HITCHLER.

